

# AGENDA

## Workshop on the Role of Bargaining, Negotiation, Compromise and Voting in Deliberative Democracy March 17-18, 2007

Sponsored by:

**The Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation  
and the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics  
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University**

### **Friday, March 16, 2007**

Various times: Participants Arrive.

**7:00pm:** Workshop Participants Dinner

### **Saturday, March 17, 2007**

**9:00am:** Continental Breakfast/Turn In of Reimbursement Forms  
Allison Dining Room, Taubman Building, KSG

#### **Session 1: Introductions, Confirmation of Agenda.**

Introductions, including a short general statement of tentative position or concerns.

Discussion: Pluralist (or “neo-pluralist”) ideals vs. classic and republican ideals.

Questions:

- a) Is the appropriate relation of deliberation on the common good to negotiation/bargaining/voting one of:
  - i) antagonism in ends and spirit,
  - ii) complementarity (division of labor: one used for one purpose, the other for a separate purpose, but both necessary and legitimate), or
  - iii) integration (can we conceive of a “deliberative ethic” [concept adapted from Besson] in negotiation, bargaining, and voting)? Can integration take the form of stressing respect for others (Thompson) in both settings?
- b) If ii) or iii), what forms should this complementarity or integration take?
- c) When (if ever) is the expression of and pursuit of self-interest normatively allowed in deliberation?

(Joshua Cohen and Bernard Manin will be joining us by speakerphone for this session)

**12- 1:30pm:** Lunch, Allison Dining Room, Taubman Building, KSG

**1:30pm:**

**Session 2 Discussion: Integrating Power and the Search for the Common Good**

Questions:

Can the quest for understanding, appropriate to deliberation on the common good, be integrated with the exercise of coercive power (the threat of sanction and the use of force)? Is strategic action (aimed at winning, not at understanding) ever legitimate in democracy? -- in democratic deliberation? (Joshua Cohen and Bernard Manin may join us by speakerphone for this session.)

a) What do we mean by “bargains,” “negotiations” and “voting”? Where, if at all, does the use of coercive power (defined as the threat of sanction and use of force) enter into these forms of decision-making?

b) Can we appropriately bargain, negotiate and compromise on moral issues?

c) Can we devise terms of fairness that integrate bargains, negotiations, and compromise – over material interests and perhaps moral issues -- into deliberative democracy? Is fairness sufficient for an integrated theory of deliberative bargaining, negotiation and compromise? Or do we need to add respect for others, and if so, what are the components of respect for others; is Thompson’s analysis adequate? Sufficient?

d) Is the intent to deceive ever legitimate in bargains, negotiations, and campaigns for the vote? Are sins of omission as immoral/illegitimate as sins of commission? (That is, in a fair and respectful negotiation or bargain are the parties required to lay all bare even when the other party has not asked a direct question)?

e) Can fair and respectful procedures of bargaining, negotiating, and compromise be part (and should they be part) of a full-fledged theory of democratic legitimacy?

f) Can such procedures be part (and should they be part) of a full-fledged theory of democratic deliberation?

**4:00pm: End of Session 2.**

**6:00pm:** Dinner, Red House, 98 Winthrop Street, Harvard Square

**Sunday, March 18, 2007**

**9:00am:** Continental Breakfast, Fainsod Room, Littauer Building, KSG  
Summary of first day

**Session 3 Discussion: Voting**

Questions:

a) Is voting antagonistic to, complementary to, or capable of being conceptually integrated into deliberation?

b) What are the norms of fairness (and respect?) in voting, and in what are they grounded? (Are they grounded in the same considerations as deliberation?)

c) Is voting part of a full-fledged theory of democratic legitimacy?

d) Majority rule is not fair or feasible in segmented societies. Consociationalism and proportional outcomes, which are fair and feasible, require bargains and negotiations. What are the norms for fairness (and respect?) in these circumstances?

d) What ought voters to vote for? Ought a voter always to vote for the common good as the voter sees it? Does a voter have an affirmative obligation to try to guard against self-serving bias? Are there any circumstances (e.g. when the vote is explicitly conceived as a measure of pure aggregation) in which a voter should simply vote her self-interest (or her group's self-interest)?

**12-1:30pm:** Lunch, Harvest, 44 Brattle Street, Harvard Square

**1:30pm: Session 4: How to Structure our Agreements and Disagreements.**

Questions:

a) Do we have systematic variations in the meaning we give to any of the terms, "deliberation," "bargain," "negotiation," "compromise," "voting"?

b) Can we construct a typology of two or more coherent but contrasting/opposing approaches regarding the relation of deliberation (and/or democratic legitimacy) to bargaining-negotiation-compromise-voting and/or the relation of deliberation to self-interest? (e.g. typology #1: deliberation and bargaining-negotiation-compromise-voting-self-interest are antithetical; typology #2: they can be integrated.)

c) Possible product(s) and working arrangements.

**4:00pm: Workshop Ends**

**7:00pm: Dinner for Anyone Still in Cambridge**

Legal Seafood, 20 University Road, Harvard Square